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.
STUDENTS HAVE RIGHTS, Too: THE DRAFTING OF 
STUDENT CONDUCT CODES 
Jason J. Bach* 
"[P]erhaps the best advice that can be given is that it is 
safer to err on the side of giving students too many 
rights, rather than too few."1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
College and university student conduct codes2 serve two 
distinct purposes: (1) to guide student behavior and (2) to 
establish procedural mechanisms that safeguard the rights of 
students accused of conduct that violates a campus code. The 
level of protection afforded students varies greatly and depends 
on several factors. This article reviews the factors that those 
who draft or revise student conduct codes must consider, 
whether the institution is public or private.3 Certain 
inalienable rights are so fundamental to fairness that they 
must be observed in the rules governing student disciplinary 
hearings. To deny a student these rights is to deny the student 
a fair hearing. 
Not surprisingly, however, college and university judicial 
affairs administrators have organized to limit the rights of 
* Jason J. Bach is an association with Potter Law Offices in Las Vegas, Nevada. He 
was a member of the charter class of the University ofNebada, Las Vegas, Boyd School 
of Law, graduating in 2002. He also studied abroad in 2001 at Oxford, University, New 
College. Mr. Bach has been an avid supporter, member, board member, and chapter 
president of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). 
1. Karla H. Fox, Due Process and Student Academic Misconduct, 25 Am. Bus. L.J. 
671, 700 (1988). 
2. The term "Student Conduct Code" is used throughout this article to refer to the 
principal body of rules and policies regulating student conduct, whether it is called an 
"Honor Code," "Students Rights and Responsibilities," "Student Code of Conduct," or 
some other title. 
3. This article will often cite to previous and current student conduct codes 
adopted by the U. of Nev., Las Vegas (UNLV). The current UNLV policy, adopted in 
Aug. 2000, is one of three student conduct codes in which the author has participated 
in either drafting or redrafting. 
1 
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students. The Association of Student Judicial Affairs (ASJA) 
maintains that due process is not required in campus hearings 
and must yield to the "educational" and "developmental 
mission" of the institution.4 Additionally, the ASJA advocates 
that schools provide only "the bare minimum of 'process' to 
satisfy a judge," but fails to consider the rights of the student.5 
This article flatly rejects such an approach. The ASJA chooses 
to ignore well-established law that students hold a property 
and/or contractual interest in their education and are entitled 
to the fundamental fairness embodied in due process, whether 
they are at public or private institutions.6 
As much as the ASJA would like to deny a student his 
rights, neither principles of fairness nor the rule of law are on 
its side. In fact, schools that take steps to recognize students' 
rights find that procedures designed to protect students' rights 
protect the schools themselves, as those procedures reveal the 
relevant facts underlying the disciplinary action, and insulate 
the school from lawsuits alleging a breach of the student's 
rights. 7 
This article begins with a general explanation in section II 
of the rights and responsibilities of students. Section III 
examines the legal principles that govern both public and 
private institutions. Next, procedural due process is reviewed 
in section IV by looking at the constitutional requirements for 
public institutions and the aspirational objectives of private 
institutions. Finally, in section V, the article analyzes the 
substantive due process rights of students. 
II. STUDENT RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
A. Student Bill of Rights 
Whether an institution is public or private, it should adopt 
a student bill of rights that includes the rights protected by the 
4. Letter from Elizabeth Baldizan, Pres. ASJA, to David Gergen, editor of U.S. 
News & World Rep. in response to, "Is There Any Justice in Campus Courts?" U.S. 
News & World Rep., 2 (Aug. 30, 1999) (copy on file with BYU Education & Law 
Journal). 
5. Edward N. Stoner, Reviewing Your Student Discipline Policy: A Project Worth 
the Investment 11 (2000). 
6. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975); Tedeschi v. Wagner College, 404 
N.E.2d 1302, 1306 (N.Y. 1980). 
7. Alan Charles Kors & Harvey A. Silverglate, The Shadow University, 270-271 
(The Free Press 1998). 
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United States Constitution and the constitution of the 
particular state in which the institution resides. In addition, 
rights may be added or elaborated upon to meet the particular 
purposes of a college or university environment. Those rights to 
be considered include: 
• Due process, guaranteeing substantive and 
procedural fairness; 
• Freedom from discrimination on the basis of race, 
sex, age, religion, creed, national origin, disability, or 
sexual orientation; 
• The right to engage in inquiry and discussion, to 
exchange thought and opinion, and to speak, write, and 
print freely on any subject; 
• The right to exercise one's rights and freedoms 
without fear of university interference; 
• The opportunity to participate in the formulation of 
policy directly affecting students through membership 
on appropriate committees and in student 
organizations; 
• Ready access to established university policies and 
procedures; 
• The right to engage in peaceful and orderly speech, 
protest, demonstration, and picketing within the public 
forum which does not disrupt the educational functions 
of the university; 
• The right to adequate notice of charges alleged; 
• Protection from unreasonable searches and seizures; 
• The right to be represented by an attorney or other 
advisor; 
• The right to cross-examine witnesses; and 
• The right to an open hearing. 8 
These are just examples of the basic rights that any student 
conduct code should expressly protect. Institutions should go 
further to afford students other rights, such as the general 
right to a fair and speedy resolution after due notice has been 
provided. In addition, to ensure a fair process, the accused 
student should have full discovery privileges, including access 
to all of the evidence that may be used against him, and should 
8. U. of Nev. Las Vegas, Student Conduct Code (2000) (rev. version adopted Aug., 
2000) (hereinafter "UNLV Student Conduct Code"). 
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have ample time to review and investigate the evidence. 
It is not enough, however, for a school to go through the 
motions of enacting a student conduct code. For any such code 
to have credibility, the institution must abide by it. In Lightsey 
v. King, 9 a student was given a grade of "zero" for cheating, 
even after the institution's Honor Board found him "not guilty" 
of the allegations. The court held that, "there was no difference 
between failing to provide a due process hearing and providing 
one but ignoring the outcome. By holding the Honor Board 
hearing and then disregarding its result, the Academy violated 
Lightsey's right to due process."10 
The procedural protections necessary to preserve students' 
rights will be discussed in greater detail throughout this 
article. Each institution should evaluate the need for 
additional protections which assure that students obtain and 
receive a fair process that leads to a reliable determination of 
the issues. 
B. Institutional Duties to Inform Students of Their 
Responsibilities 
Institutions owe students a duty to inform them of the 
actions for which they will be held accountable. Descriptions of 
actions that will violate the student conduct code may vary 
from a simple statement of responsibility, such as "any conduct 
unbecoming of a student," to a laundry list of possible 
infractions. The ideal code lies somewhere in the middle. 
Code drafters must be cautious not to prohibit any activity 
that is protected by other sections of the conduct code, or is an 
otherwise protected right of students. Additionally, overly 
broad codes fail to serve one of the central purposes of a 
student conduct code, which is to put students on notice of the 
conduct expected of them. 
Among the many issues for a school to consider is whether 
the procedures established in the student conduct code apply to 
accusations that a student violated a federal, state, or local 
law. Concerns about interfering with the criminal justice 
process, and thereby violating students' rights, led former 
Boston University President John Silber to determine that 
colleges should not attempt to discipline students for alleged 
9. Lightsey u. King, 567 F. Supp. 645 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). 
10. !d. at 649. 
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crimes, but instead should report them to the police. 11 The 
responsibilities imposed on students, however, will depend 
greatly on the type of institution they are attending, whether 
public or private. 12 
Ill. LEGAL PRINCIPLES THAT GOVERN BOTH 
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INSTITUTIONS 
A. Constitutional Law 
Public institutions are required to provide a certain level of 
due process and other constitutional rights to their students 
because they act as an arm of the state. 13 Private institutions, 
however, are not bound by the United States Constitution to 
provide the same level of safeguards. The courts have 
consistently set private schools apart, despite the fact that the 
vast majority of private colleges and universities receive loans, 
grants, and scholarships from the federal government, and 
thus appear to be quasi-public institutions. The United States 
Supreme Court held in Rendell-Eaker v. Kohn, 14 that an 
otherwise private school does not engage in "state action," 15 
even when public funds account for as much as 99% of the 
school's operating budget. 16 The Court compared the fiscal 
relationship between the private school and the state to private 
contractors who use state funds to build roads, but are not 
state actors. 17 Had the Court ruled otherwise, private schools 
receiVmg substantial public funds would have been 
constitutionally required to protect the rights of their students. 
However, both private and public institutions have moral, 
ethical, and educational duties to treat accused students with 
respect, dignity, and fairness, regardless of legal duties. While 
students at private schools may not have a constitutionally 
protected property interest, they nonetheless hold important 
contractual interests and deserve to be treated with the 
fundamental fairness that is at the heart of the due process 
11. Paul E. Rosenthal, Speak Now: The Accused Student's Right to Remain Silent 
in Public University Disciplinary Proceedings, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 1241, 1249 (1997). 
12. See e.g. UNL V Student Conduct Code. 
13. Goss, 419 U.S. at 574. 
14. Rendell-Eaker u. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982). 
15. !d. at 844 (White, concurring). 
16. !d. at 8:~2. 
17. !d. at 840-841. 
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protections of the United States Constitution. That said, it 
would be disingenuous to suggest that private institutions will 
voluntarily consent to be held to the same standards for 
application of rights afforded to public school students. But 
even if private institutions are not persuaded by fairness and 
justice, other issues must be considered. 
B. Contract Law 
Both public and private institutions establish a contractual 
relationship between themselves and their students. Most 
universities have adopted written student conduct codes, or 
general policies of fairness, which are distributed to students. 
Courts have held that schools may not deviate from the express 
due process protections established in their student conduct 
codes, whether they are public or private institutions, as such 
deviations would violate the implied contractual interests of 
the student. 18 
To understand whether a contract exists between a student 
and an institution, one must examine the elements of a 
contract. A contract requires that there be a bargain, which 
includes both a manifestation of mutual assent to the exchange 
and "consideration." In contract law parlance, consideration 19 
is the returned promise or performance bargained for. For 
example, a student pays tuition in consideration for an 
education. An institution provides education in consideration 
for tuition. 
The terms of a contract need not be fully expressed and 
contained within a formal document, but may be implied by 
law, or by the parties' conduct, or by other evidence of mutual 
assent. 20 There are two types of implied contracts, implied-in-
fact and implied-in-law.21 An implied-in-fact contract "is one 
that is inferred from the statements or conduct of the parties. 
It is not a promise defined by the law, but one made by the 
parties, though not expressly."22 Student conduct codes, for 
example, are implied-in-fact contracts. In contrast, an implied-
in-law duty arises when the contract is silent, but the law 
18. Tedeschi, 404 N,E.2d at 1306. 
19. Restatement (Second) of Contracts ~17(1)(1981). 
20. Arthur Linton Corbin. Contracts vol. 3, § 541, 97 (West Publg. Co. 1960); see 
also Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorialllospital, 710 P.2d 102.5, 1036 (Ariz. 1985). 
21. Wagenseller, 710 P.2d at 1036. 
22. Id. 
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requires that a duty be imposed even though the parties may 
not have intended it?' 
A contractual relationship begins when the institution 
accepts the student's application for admission. 24 The effect of 
the acceptance is to make an irrevocable offer to the successful 
applicant, usually for a limited period of time, for a seat in the 
entering class. By making a deposit before the offer expires, 
the applicant extends the offer until the beginning of the school 
year. Before classes start, the applicant will arrive on campus 
and register, thereby becoming an enrolled student. If the 
student is a degree candidate, he expects to be offered a 
curriculum which, if completed satisfactorily, will lead to the 
degree. The student further expects that the school will treat 
him fairly, including not being subjected to arbitrary grading or 
dismissal, extreme tuition hikes, or a sizable escalation of the 
degree requirements. These expectations are implied-in-law 
terms of the contract that the student enters into with the 
institution. Though not explicitly spelled out, they are 
essential to the student's ability to benefit from the bargain he 
entered into with the institution, and are thus implied as part 
of the contract. Payment of a student's tuition constitutes 
consideration for these expectations?5 
In return, the school expects payment of tuition and fees 
and compliance by the student with a set of rules, both 
academic and non-academic, as a member of the university 
community. The school's expectations, like those of the 
student, are implied-in-law terms of the contract. These 
mutual understandings and expectations form the essence of a 
contractual relationship. 26 
An additional, and essential, part of the student-university 
relationship is the implied-in-fact contract created by a written 
student conduct code. Usually issued annually, the student 
conduct code is one of the primary documents used by the 
school to describe to students the academic and non-academic 
requirements and limitations placed upon them. The student 
conduct code puts students on notice that their continued 
23. Id. (citing Arthur Linton Corbin, Contracts vol. 1, § 17, 38 (West Publg. Co. 
1960)) 
24. Curtis .J. Bergpr & Vivian Berger, Academic Discipline: A Guide to Fair 
Process for the University Student, 99 Col urn. L. Rev. 289, 318-319 (1999). 
25. I d. at 319. 
26. Id. 
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enrollment is subject to their obedience of the school's rules, 
and also informs them of the procedures to be followed in the 
event of any alleged disobedience. The written code provides 
the terms and conditions to be followed by both the school and 
the student, thus creating an implied-in-fact contract between 
the school and the student. 
In Tedeschi u. Wagner College,27 a private college suspended 
a part-time student because of her alleged disruptive and 
abusive conduct during and outside class. The student filed 
suit seeking monetary damages and reinstatement in the 
college. 28 She alleged that the school had not given her a 
hearing or any opportunity to defend herself.29 The New York 
state trial court entered judgment for the defendant, holding 
that the United States Constitution did not apply because the 
private college was not "state involved," and because the 
school's informal procedure was carried out in good faith and 
was not arbitrary. 30 After a split Appellate Division affirmed, 
the New York Court of Appeals reversed, ordering that the 
student be conditionally reinstated. 31 
The court pointed to a college brochure, "1976-1977 
Guidelines of Wagner College," which outlined Wagner's 
procedure for adjudicating academic and non-academic 
suspension or dismissal. 32 The college had failed to convene the 
Student-Faculty Hearing Board, which the guidelines required, 
prior to suspending the student.33 On appeal, she argued that 
the student-private college relationship is contractual and that 
an implied term of the contract is that the school will observe 
its own rules.34 
In short, New York's highest court held: 
Whether by analogy to the law of associations, on the 
basis of a supposed contract between university and 
student, or simply as a matter of essential fairness in 
the somewhat one-sided relationship between the 
institution and the individual, we hold that when a 
university has adopted a rule or guideline establishing 
27. 404 N.E.2d at 1302. 
28. ld. at 1304. 
29. ld. 
30. ld. 
31. Id. at 1307. 
32. ld. at 1304. 
33. ld. at 1306. 
34. Id. at 1305. 
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the procedure to be followed in relation to suspension or 
expulsion that procedure must be substantially 
observed.15 
9 
Since Tedeschi, a number of other courts have required that 
private schools act in accordance with their published policies.36 
For example, in Fellheimer v. Middlebury College, the United 
States District Court for the District of Vermont held that 
Middlebury College was contractually bound to provide 
students with the procedural safeguards and rights it promised 
in its publications.37 To deviate from those published 
procedures would make the hearing fundamentally unfair. 38 
In addition, a university's suspension or other punishment 
of a student without good cause violates the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing, which is an implied-in-law term of the 
contract. 39 The covenant of good faith and fair dealing requires 
that neither contracting party do anything that will injure the 
right of the other to receive the benefits of their agreement.40 
In this case, the right of the student to receive an education, 
and the right of the university to educate others. It imposes on 
the school a good faith duty, at a minimum, to substantially 
adhere to its published disciplinary procedures. "In certain 
circumstances, breach of contract, including breach of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, may provide the basis 
for a tort claim."41 
35. !d. at 1306. (emphasis added) 
36. Fellheimer v. Middlebury College, 869 F. Supp. 238, 244 (D. Vt. 1994) (college 
breached its contractual duty when it failed to put student on notice of all charges 
against him); Holert v. U. of Chi., 751 F. Supp. 1294, 1301 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (student is 
entitled to the procedural safeguards that the school agreed to provide); Schaer v. 
Brandeis U., 735 N.E.2d 373, 381 (Mass. 2000) (a university should follow its 
established rules); Anderson v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 1995 WL 813188, 1, 4 (Mass. 
Super. 1995) (courts may intervene when school's action was arbitrary and capricious). 
37. 869 F. Supp. 238 at 242. 
38. !d. at 246. 
39. See Corbin, supra n. 20, at 97; Samuel Williston, The Law of Contracts vol. 5, 
§ 670, 159 (3d ed., Baker, Voorhis & Co. 1961); Wagenseller, 710 P.2d at 1038 (citing 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 (1981)); Savoca Masonry Co. v. Homes & Son 
Constr. Co., 542 P.2d 817,821 (Ariz. 1975). 
40. See Wagenseller, 710 P.2d at 1038 (citing Comunale v. Traders & General Ins. 
Co., 328 P.2d 198, 200 (Cal. 1958)); Fortune v. Natl. Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 
1251, 1257 (Mass. 1977). 
41. See Wag{?enseller, 710 P.2d at 1038-1039 (citing Noble v. Natl. Am. Life Ins. 
Co., 624 P.2d 866, 868 (Ariz. 1981)); Seamen's Direct Buying Serv. v. Stand. Oil Co. of 
Cal., 686 P.2d 1158 (Cal. 1984), overruled; Wallis v. Super. Ct, 207 Cal.Rptr. 123 
(1984); Gates v. Life of Mont. Ins. Co., 638 P.2d 1063 (Mont. 1982). 
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In Napolitano v. Trustees of Princeton University,42 a New 
Jersey state court held that a university disciplinary hearing 
that resulted in the withholding of the student's degree for one 
year failed to comply with the university's own rules because 
the student was not informed in a timely manner that she had 
the right to cross-examine witnesses. The court ordered the 
disciplinary committee to rehear the matter and, at that 
hearing, to allow the student to call any witnesses she wished 
and to cross-examine any witnesses presented against her, as 
the school rules provided.43 
Princeton had not refused to allow the student to cross-
examine adverse witnesses, but had failed to inform her in a 
timely fashion that she had such a right. 44 While the term 
"good faith" was not used by the court, the court appears to 
have been saying that the university had a good faith 
contractual duty to timely inform the student that she had a 
right to cross-examine witnesses, in addition to its duty to 
protect the student's rights as expressly stated in the student 
handbook. 
C. Basic Fairness 
In addition to reviewing students' allegations of breach of 
contract, courts review private schools' disciplinary decisions to 
ensure that they are not arbitrary and capricious45 and to 
ensure that their processes are conducted with basic fairness. 46 
In Anderson v. Mass. Inst. o{Tech., the Massachusetts Superior 
Court went so far as to adopt a rule that the court may only 
intervene in the student-private school relationship when the 
student demonstrates that the school's action was arbitrary 
and capricious, when the student demonstrates that the school 
failed to follow its own disciplinary rules, or when the student 
demonstrates that the school did not afford the student a 
hearing that was fundamentally fair. 47 
42. Napolitano v. Trustees of Princeton U., 453 A.2d 279 (N.J. Super. Ch. Div. 
1982). 
43. Id. at 281-282. 
44. Id. at 281. 
45. Coveney v. Pres. of' College of' the Holy Cross, 445 N.E.2d 136, 138 (Mass. 
1983); Ahlum v. Administrs. of the Tulane Educ. Fund, 617 S.2d 96, 98-99 (La. App. 
1993); Psi Upsilon of Phila. v. Univ. of Pa., 591 A.2d 755, 760 (Pa. Super. 1991); 
Anderson, 1995 WL 813188, at 4-5. 
46. Cloud v. Trustees of Boston U., 720 F.2d 721, 725 (1st Cir. 1983). 
47. Anderson, 1995 WL 813188, at 4. 
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Such hearings at the very least should provide the 
student with written notice of the charges against him 
or her; a written description of the evidence upon which 
the charges are based; the names of the witnesses which 
the university intends to call at the hearing; an 
unbiased disciplinary committee or tribunal; an 
opportunity to be heard and present witnesses in his 
behalf; and the right to confront and controvert the 
evidence presented by the university. 48 
II 
These contractual rights found by the Anderson court are 
precisely the same as the due process rights afforded students 
at public institutions.49 
Another issue to consider is the bargaining strength of the 
contracting parties. The contract between a student and a 
school is almost always prescribed by the institution, with the 
student having virtually no bargaining power. Contracts with 
such power imbalances are commonly referred to as contracts 
of adhesion, because one party has no bargaining power or 
ability to participate in the drafting of the contract, making 
that party weaker. The Restatement of Contracts, dealing with 
standardized agreements, allows courts to consider the 
"reasonable expectations" of the weaker party. 5° Moreover, if a 
private entity performs a service of "great importance to the 
public," the courts must give greater than usual scrutiny to the 
terms of the entity's standardized contract with a weaker 
party. 51 This power imbalance goes to the very essence of the 
"one-sided relationship" described by the Tedeschi court in 
reinstating a part-time student based on the school's failure to 
48. !d. 
49. Rut see Schaer, 735 N.E.2d at 380 ("basic fairness" in school disciplinary 
hearings is not the equivalent of constitutional rights, or even procedural safeguards 
afforded by the rules of evidence). 
50. Restatement (Second) of Contracts, §211 (1981). Standardized Agreements. 
( 1) Except as stated in Subsection (3), where a party to an agreement 
signs or otherwise manifests assent to a writing and has reason to 
believe that like writings are regularly used to embody terms of 
agreements of the same type, he adopts the writing as an integrated 
agreement with respect to the terms included in the writing. (2) Such a 
writing is interpreted wherever reasonable as treating alike all those 
similarly situated, without regard to their knowledge or understanding 
of the standard terms of the writing. (3) Where the other party has 
reason to believe that the party manifesting such assent would not do 
so if he knew that the writing contained a particular term, the term is 
not part of the agreement. 
51. Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 195 (1981). 
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follow its own procedures. 52 
Accreditation requirements give schools another incentive 
to adopt and abide by fair conduct codes. Both private and 
public institutions hold some form of accreditation to lend 
integrity to the degrees they award. Many accrediting bodies 
require that their institutional members provide at least a 
minimal degree of fairness to their students. One large 
accrediting organization, for example, requires that the school's 
"[p]olicies on student rights and responsibilities, including 
grievance procedures, are clearly stated, well publicized and 
readily available, and fairly and consistently administered."53 
Accrediting bodies also provide mechanisms for students, or 
others, to file complaints against a school and claim that they 
are in violation of the accreditation standards. 
Whether a student attends a public or private university, 
he is entitled to certain fundamental rights by the United 
States Constitution, by a contract, or by both. The recognition 
and protection of those rights are not only just and beneficial to 
an educational environment, but ensures that an accused 
student is treated fairly and given an opportunity to 
adequately defend himself, while not compromising the 
institutional interests of the university. 
IV. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS: CONSTITUTIONAL 
REQUIREMENTS FOR PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS; AsPIRATIONAL 
OBJECTIVES FOR PRIVATE INSTITUTIONS54 
A History 
Under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
52. Tedeschi, 404 N.E.2d at 1306. 
53. New England Assn. of Schools and Colleges, Stand. for Accreditation 6.9 
(adopted 1992, rev. 2001). 
54. Along with denying that students are entitled to due process, the ASJA 
contends that student disciplinary hearings should never be compared to criminal 
proceedings, and that rights afforded accused criminals are not applicable to students. 
See Stoner, supra n. 5, at 2, 7-10. While those accused of crimes are entitled to greater 
due process than students, the most fundamental due process rights of any person 
encountering coercive governmental action are rooted in criminal law. For that reason, 
it is useful to look at criminal law as an analogy when determining students' rights. 
Comparatively, an accused student and a criminal defendant hold many similarities. In 
each instance, a significant and valuable interest is in jeopardy, while the individual 
must defend against the nearly unlimited resources of the institution or state. In 
addition, public institutions are state actors and, as such, are required to act within the 
scope and strictures of the United States Constitution. Goss, 419 U.S. at 574. 
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Constitution, no state may "deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law."55 The United States 
Supreme Court has established that students have a property 
interest in their education.56 "[A] student's legitimate 
entitlement to a public education [is] a property interest which 
is protected by the Due Process Clause and which may not be 
taken away for misconduct without adherence to the minimum 
procedures required by that Clause."57 
The first case to recognize a university student's right to 
due process in a disciplinary hearing was Dixon v. Alabama 
State Board of Education. 58 In this case from the civil rights 
era, Alabama State College expelled nine bJack students, 
without notice and without the benefit of a hearing,59 after the 
students conducted a sit-in demonstration at a public 
courthouse lunch grill that refused service to blacks.60 The 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that due process required 
notice and a hearing before a student at a tax-supported college 
could be expelled for misconduct.61 
Furthermore, the Court made clear that a state institution 
may not circumvent the fundamental right to due process by 
conditioning a grant of admission upon students' agreeing to 
give up their constitutional right to due process.62 The school 
must establish some reasonable grounds for its disciplinary 
actions and must do so procedurally through "fundamental 
principles of fairness."63 The court would test fairness by 
examining the sufficiency of the hearing and the notice 
preceding it.64 
The Dixon court broadly defined the notice and hearing 
required in cases of student expulsion: "[A]n opportunity to 
hear both sides in considerable detail is best suited to protect 
the rights of all involved. This is not to imply that a full-dress 
55. U.S. Const. amend. XIV§ 1. 
56. Goss, 419 U.S. at 574. 
57. ld. 
58. Dixon v. Ala. St. Ed. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 
U.S. 930 (1961). 
59. ld. at 158. 
60. ld. at 152, n. 3. 
61. ld. at 158. 
62. Id. at 156 (citing Slochower v. Ed. of Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 555 (1956), 
overruled). 
63. Dixon, 294 F.2d at 157. 
64. ld. at 158-159. 
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judicial hearing, with the right to cross-examine witnesses, is 
required."65 
More than a decade later, the federal District Court for the 
District of Puerto Rico took due process a step further. 66 In 
Marin v. University of Puerto Rico, the court held that students 
are entitled to: 
(1) adequate advance notice ... of (a) the charges, (b) the 
specific, previously promulgated regulations under 
which the charges are brought, and (c) the evidence 
against the student; (2) a full, expedited evidentiary 
hearing (a) presided over by an impartial, previously 
uninvolved official, (b) the proceedings of which are 
transcribed, at which the student (c) can present 
evidence and (d) cross-examine opposing witnesses, (e) 
with the assistance of retained counsel; and (3) a 
written decision by the presiding official encompassing 
(a) findings of fact, (b) the substantial evidence on which 
the findings rest, and, (c) the reasons for the official's 
conclusion. 67 
The Marin court held that these due process protections must 
be guarded most scrupulously when the university's action may 
damage the student's standing in the community, or may 
impose a stigma or "mark on one's record that may well 
preclude further study at any public and many private 
institutions and limit the positions one can qualify for after 
termination of one's studies."6g To date, Marin marks the outer 
limit of rights recognized for students. 
Until the United States Supreme Court's Goss v. Lopez69 
decision in 1975, jurisdictions remained split as to whether 
students were entitled to any due process by public educational 
institutions. In Goss, the Court set aside the summary 1.0-day 
suspensions of nine high school students charged with various 
acts of disruptive conduct during school hours. 70 "At the very 
minimum," the Court held, "due process requires, in connection 
with a suspension of 10 days or less, that the student be given 
oral or written notice of the charges against him and, if he 
65. !d. at 159. 
66. Marin v. U. of P.R., 377 F. Supp. 613 (D.P.R. 1974). 
67. !d. at 623. 
68. Id. at 622 (citing Bd. of Regents of St. Colleges u. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 57."3 
(1972)). 
69. 419 U.S. 565. 
70. !d. 
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denies them, an explanation of the evidence the authorities 
have and an opportunity to present his side of the story.'m Had 
the suspension exceeded 10 days, the Court might have 
required "more formal procedures.'m The Court concluded that 
the adequacy of the notice and the nature of the hearing 
sufficient to satisfy due process would vary according to an 
"appropriate accommodation of the competing interests 
involved.'m 
A landmark decision, Goss opened the gates for cases 
brought by students at all educational levels. In one example 
of Goss's application, Crook v. Baker,74 the federal District 
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan held that a 
university student was entitled to notice and a hearing before 
the University of Michigan could rescind a graduate's master's 
degree on the grounds that he had fabricated data underlying 
his thesis. 75 After Goss, schools could no longer deny students 
their procedural due process, and expect to get away with it. 
Procedural due process begins with adequate notice and a 
hearing, as established by Goss. In addition, several other 
factors must be considered. For example, accused students 
should have the option to cross-examine witnesses, to be 
represented by counsel, to elect to have an open hearing, and to 
have a fair evidentiary standard of proof. While these 
considerations may seem basic and essential to achieving due 
process, many institutions deny them to students. The 
following sections explore each of these considerations. 
B. Adequate Notice 
The Goss Court determined that high school students facing 
deprivation of a property right by suspension from school must, 
at a minimum, "be given some kind of notice and afforded some 
kind of hearing."76 In an earlier decision, the Supreme Court 
had established that "[a]n elementary and fundamental 
requirement of due process ... is notice reasonably calculated, 
under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the 
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to 
71. ld. at 581. 
72. ld. at 584. 
73. Id. at 579. 
74. Crook v. Baker, 584 F. Supp. 1531, 1556 (E.D. Mich. 1984), vacated. 
75. Id. 
76. 419 U.S. at 579 (emphasis added). 
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present their objections."77 Applying that standard in Goldberg 
v. Kelly, 78 the Supreme Court held that a few days notice is 
generally inadequate for the termination of welfare benefits. 
Lower courts have specifically held that notice of five days or 
less for an employment termination hearing is insufficient 
notice.79 
In a case involving a private college, the United States 
District Court for the District of Vermont reversed Middlebury 
College's one year suspension of a student, holding that the 
school deviated from its published notice policy by informing 
the accused student of only one of the two charges that had 
been brought against him.80 The court held that the college 
must "state the nature of the charges with sufficient 
particularity to permit the accused party to meet the charges," 
as expressed in the school's policy.81 
What constitutes adequate notice may be difficult to 
measure, but colleges and universities are clearly at an 
advantage over a student who may have limited or no 
resources with which to prepare for a hearing. The guiding 
principle should be that students have ample time to secure 
and obtain the advice of counsel, to review and investigate the 
claims against them, and to prepare a defense to the 
accusations made against them. Considering the limited 
resources of students, a notice of fewer than ten working days 
likely does not allow an accused student time to adequately 
defend himself. 
A sufficient notice policy not only must provide for ample 
time to prepare, but also must define the method by which 
notice is to be served and the information to be provided to the 
accused. The University of Nevada, Las Vegas, has adopted the 
following notice policy in its student conduct code: 
A. A notice of hearing letter from the Administrative 
Officer must be provided to the charged student and the 
77. Mullane v. C. Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950); see also Memphis 
Light, Gas & Water Diu. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 13 (1978). 
78. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268 (1970) (fairness in some cases may 
require more than seven days' notice of the termination of welfare benefits). 
79. Walker v. U.S., 744 F.2d 67, 70 (lOth Cir.1984) (five days' notice to a public 
employee insufficient pre-termination notice); Wagner v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., :~73 F. 
Supp. 876 (E.D. Ark. 1974) (one day inadequate to notify a school teacher of her 
termination hearing). 
80. Fellheimer, 869 F. Supp. at 246-247. 
81. ld. at 246. 
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complainant a minimum of ten (10) college working 
days prior to any hearing. A letter of charge includes 
the following information: 
1. Date, time, place of hearing; 
2. Specification ofthe misconduct charged; 
3. Name of complainant; 
4. Specification, to the extent possible, of the time, 
place, person(s) involved and circumstances of 
alleged prohibited conduct and name(s) of possible 
witnesses; names of persons who may have 
witnessed the alleged prohibited conduct. 
5. Notification that the person charged may be 
accompanied by an advisor of the charged person's 
choice; 
6. A copy of the applicable disciplinary hearing 
procedures; and 
7. Such other information as the Administrative 
Officer may wish to include. 
B. Notices shall be either hand-delivered directly to 
the person charged or sent by certified or registered 
mail. Notices delivered by mail are considered delivered 
when sent, provided that three (3) additional college 
working days shall be added to the time period set forth 
for minimum notice. 
C. If the person charged intends to have an attorney 
or other representative present, he or she must notify 
the Administrative Officer no later than five (5) college 
working days before the hearing of the name and 
address of the advisor, if any, and whether the advisor 
is an attorney. If, at any time during the proceeding, 
the student desires a representative or a change of 
representative, that right may be invoked. The 
proceeding will be stayed for a period of no fewer than 
five (5) and no more than fifteen (15) college working 
days. This right may be invoked only once during any 
disciplinary proceeding, unless the Administrative 
Officer agrees to any additional requests for changes of 
representation or unless the student's attorney 
withdraws.x2 
17 
To summanze, the UNLV code achieves fairness by 
82. UNLV Student Conduct Code, supra n. 8, Section VII. 
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notifying the accused student at least ten days prior to the 
hearing; by providing the date, time, and place of the hearing; 
by specifying the misconduct alleged; and by disclosing the 
names of the complainant and witnesses who may testify. The 
accused student is also provided with a copy of the applicable 
hearing procedures. Additionally, the UNLV code specifies 
that the accused student is to be notified by certified or 
registered mail. 83 
C. Hearing 
Goss held that an accused student is entitled to a basic 
hearing, even when the punishment is minimal.84 When the 
possible sanction is greater than the 10-day suspensions in 
Goss, a greater amount of due process may be owed. 85 In 
Mathews v. Eldridge, 86 the United States Supreme Court held 
that three factors are important when considering the 
constitutional adequacy of the procedures afforded in a given 
situation and whether due process reqmres additional 
procedures: 
First, the private interest that will be affected by the 
official action; second, the risk of an erroneous 
deprivation of such interest through the procedures 
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or 
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the 
[g]overnment's interest, including the function involved 
and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the 
additional or substitute procedural requirement would 
entail. 87 
Institutions, both public and private, have developed many 
types of disciplinary hearings. Most commonly, student 
disciplinary hearings are conducted by committees. These 
committees often consist of student, faculty, and administrative 
members, and are chaired by a predetermined member. 
Conventional wisdom seems to be that this type of committee, 
made up of a cross-section of the campus community, at least 
gives the perception of being unbiased and fair. Whether this 
83. !d. 
84. Goss, at 419 U.S. at 581 (holding that high school students suspended for 10 
days or less are entitled to notice and a hearing). 
85. ld. at 584. 
86. Mathews u. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
87. !d. at 335. 
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is true depends on the committee selection process and the 
opinions and beliefs of the individual committee members. 
The selection of members for the committee is often left up 
to a sole administrator or delegated to organized bodies, such 
as the student council and faculty senate. Selection of the 
members, however chosen, should be closely scrutinized, 
similar to a court's screening of a potential jury member. At a 
minimum, such scrutiny should require that the committee 
members not be directly or indirectly biased against the 
accused student. Committee members should also be 
competent to weigh the evidence against the applicable 
evidentiary standard. An accused student should always have 
the right to challenge any committee member for cause. 
Some schools provide the accused student with a variety of 
hearing options. These options may include the choice between 
a hearing committee or a single hearing officer. Other 
institutions also offer students the opportunity to select a 
hearing conducted by a "special hearing officer," who is an 
attorney or has professional experience in presiding over 
judicial or quasi-judicial adversary proceedings and who has no 
contractual relationship with the institution.R8 
The most troubling type of hearing is one in which a single 
hearing officer, usually a dean or appointed administrator, 
determines the fate of the accused student, almost always 
behind closed doors, with the student having no other options. 
In their book, The Shadow University, Alan Charles Kors and 
Harvey A Silverglate state: 
There is virtually no place left in the United States 
where kangaroo courts and Star Chambers are the rule 
rather than the exception-except on college and 
university campuses ... where not only is arbitrariness 
widespread, but where fair procedures and rational fact-
finding mechanisms, with disturbing and surfrising 
frequency, are actually precluded by regulations.8 
These flawed types of hearings lack integrity and 
sophistication because they make no attempt to bring together 
a cross-section from the academic community and are very 
often just an administrative tool used to quickly dispense with 
students who are looked upon unfavorably. 
An impartial and complete hearing is an essential 
88. UNLV Student Conduct Code, supra n. 8. 
il9. Kors & Silverglate, supra n. 7, at 276. 
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guarantee of due process.'Jo As the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals stated in Boykins v. Fairfield Board of Education, 91 
"[b]asic fairness and integrity of the fact-finding process are the 
guiding stars.'m The failure of public institutions, in 
particular, to adopt and administer procedures that provide a 
fair and impartial proceeding subjects those institutions to 
liability. Ensuring basic fairness in hearings is good policy for 
both students and university administrations. 
D. Cross-Examination 
Cross-examination of adverse witnesses is a fundamental 
constitutional right enjoyed by an accused. This right is 
essential to an accused's ability to elicit unfavorable 
information from the opposing party's witnesses and to show 
that a witness is biased, prejudiced, or untrustworthy for any 
reason. Denial of this basic right short-changes and discredits 
any disciplinary hearing process. 
In Davis v. Alaska,93 the United States Supreme Court held 
that the goals of cross-examination could not be achieved 
"except by the direct and personal putting of questions."94 
Professor Wigmore reasoned in his classic treatise on evidence: 
"Cross-examination is a right, because of its efficacy in securing 
more than could have been expected from a direct examination 
by a friendly examiner."95 As the United States Supreme Court 
held in Pointer v. Texas, 96 "There are few subjects, perhaps, 
upon which this Court and other courts have been more nearly 
unanimous than in their expressions of belief that the right of 
confrontation and cross-examination is an essential and 
fundamental requirement for the kind of fair trial which is this 
country's constitutional goal."97 A full cross-examination of a 
witness upon the subjects of his examination in chief is the 
right, not the mere privilege, of the party against whom the 
witness is called.98 
90. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46-47 (1975). 
91. Boykins v. Fairfield Bd. oj'Educ., 492 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1974). 
92. !d. at 701. 
93. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974). 
94. !d. at 316, quotin{J John H. Wigmore, Evidence val. 5, § 1395, 123 (3d ed. 
1942). 
95 .• John H. Wigmore, Evidence val. 3 § 944 (Chadbourn rev. 1970). 
96. Pointer v. Tex., 380 U.S. 400 (1965). 
97. !d. at 405. 
98. Lindsey, 133 F.2d at 369 (D.C. Cir. 1942), overruled; Heard v. U. S., 255 F. 
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It may not be an exaggeration to claim, as Wigmore does, 
that cross-examination "is beyond any doubt the greatest legal 
engine ever invented for the discovery of truth."99 Its 
effectiveness in testing the accuracy and completeness of 
testimony is so well understood that the right of cross-
examination is "one of the safeguards essential to a fair 
trial."100 Evidence supplied through witnesses is subject not 
only to the possible inaccuracies of falsification or bias, but it is 
also subject to the inaccuracies which unintentionally flow from 
the flaws of human observation, memory, and description. 
"The annals of the legal profession are filled with instances in 
which testimony, plausible when supplied on examination in 
chief, has by cross-examination been shown to be, for one or 
more of the reasons mentioned, faulty or worthless."101 
Certainly, no one experienced in procedural due process would 
deny the value of cross-examination in bringing out the truth if 
indeed, "[c]ross-examination is the principal means by which 
the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are 
tested." 102 
The theory of cross-examination supports what has been 
learned from years of practical experience. On direct 
examination, a witness, even if completely unbiased, only 
discloses part of the necessary facts, chiefly because his 
testimony is given only by way of answers to specific questions, 
and the party producing him will usually ask only for the facts 
favorable to his side of the case. Someone must probe for the 
remaining facts and qualifying circumstances, and ensure that 
the testimony is accurate, complete, and clearly understood. 
The best person to do that is the one most vitally interested, 
namely the opponent. 103 For these reasons, cross-examination 
is "a right long deemed so essential for the due protection of life 
and liberty that it is guarded against legislative and judicial 
action by provisions in the Constitution of the United States 
and in the constitutions of most, if not all, the States composing 
829, 832 (8th Cir. 1919). See, e. g., Douglas v. Ala., 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965); Alford v. 
U. S., 282 U.S. 687, 691 (1931), overruled; Charles A. Wright, Federal Practice and 
Procedure, Criminal vol. 2, § 416 (West 1969). 
99. ,John H. Wigmore, Evidence vol. 5 § 1367 (3d ed. 1942). 
100. Alford, at 692. 
101. Lindsey, 133 F.2d at 369; See Wigmore, supra n. 99, at§ 782(3), (4). 
102. Davis, 415 U.S. at 316. 
103. Wigmore, supra n. 99, at§ 1368. 
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the Union." 104 
A second major function of cross-examination is to show 
that the witness is biased, prejudiced, or untrustworthy. "The 
facts which diminish the personal trustworthiness or credit of 
the witness will also, in every likelihood, have remained 
undisclosed on the direct examination."105 
Cross-examination is as vital to the establishment of truth 
in student discipline hearings as in court proceedings. In 
Donohue v. Baker, 106 the federal District Court for the Northern 
District of New York ruled that the Constitution entitled a 
SUNY-Cobleskill student to cross-examine his accuser at a 
suspension hearing. Because the accused student had not been 
permitted to cross-examine the student who accused him of 
sexual assault, neither directly nor indirectly, the judge denied 
summary judgment to the defendants. 107 Like many colleges 
and universities, SUNY attempted to protect the alleged victim 
of sexual assault by sparing her from the mental anguish of 
being questioned by her alleged attacker. 10g In Donohue, both 
the accused and the accuser acknowledged that they had 
sexual intercourse, but disagreed as to whether it was 
consensual. 109 Therefore, witness credibility played a large role 
in determining the facts of the case. 
The court held, "[f]rom the record, it appears that the only 
evidence that was before the panel came in the form of [the 
complainant's] two statements alleging sexual misconduct and 
the plaintiffs two statements denying the same." 110 The court 
continued by saying that "the disciplinary hearing became a 
test of the credibility of the [respondent's] testimony versus the 
testimony of [the complainant]."111 The court determined that 
the fundamental right of the accused to cross-examine 
witnesses outweighed any protection owed to the alleged 
victim. "Regardless of how 'sensitive' the proceeding was 
deemed to be," the court concluded, "the [SUNY] defendants 
remained bound to observe the plaintiffs constitutional 
104. Pointer, 380 U.S. at 404, (quoting Kirhy u. U. 8., 174 U.S. 47, 56 (1899)). 
105. Wigmore, supra n. 99, § 1368, at 37. 
106. Donahue u. Baker, 976 F. Supp. 136, 147 (N.D.N.Y. 1997). 
107. !d. at 149. 
108. !d. at 147. 
109. !d. at 139. 
110. !d. at 147. 
111. !d. 
lj 
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Under the principle of fundamental fairness in education, 
both public and private universities should provide accused 
students the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, whether 
legally required or not. It is important that student conduct 
codes not only stress fairness in the schools' educational and 
enforcement functions, but also present an "appearance" of 
fairness. 1 13 Denying an accused student his right to cross-
examine witnesses diminishes that "appearance."114 As the 
Fifth Circuit noted in Dixon, "[i]t is shocking that the officials 
of a[n] ... educational institution ... should not understand 
the elementary principles of fair play. It is equally shocking to 
find that a court supports them in denying to a student the 
protection given to a pickpocket."115 Thus, as a matter of 
simple fairness, all institutions should afford students accused 
of misconduct the right to cross-examine their accusers. 
E. Right to Counsel 
While colleges and universities vary in the degree of 
representation afforded students in disciplinary hearings, most 
permit some level of assistance by counsel. 116 It is not 
reasonable to expect a college student to adequately represent 
himself before a disciplinary hearing panel. The obviously 
stressful event of a disciplinary hearing is further complicated 
for the student by the participation of a college administrator 
or another student, who acts as the "prosecutor" of the charges 
alleged. This "prosecutor" usually has far more experience in 
the process, and is certainly under far less stress. Although 
many administrators complain of a student's lawyers 
"infringing upon" the hearing process, considering the 
adversarial nature and the potentially damning consequences 
of such hearings, an accused student should be afforded the full 
representation of counsel in disciplinary hearings. 
In Gideon v. Wainwright, 117 the United States Supreme 
112./d. 
113. Larry A. Di Matteo & Don Wiesner, Academic Honor Codes: A Legal and 
Ethicul Arwlysis, 19 S. Ill. U. L.J. 49, 92 (Fall, 1994). 
114. !d. 
115. Dixon, 294 F.2d at 158 (citing Warren A. Seavey, Dismissal of Students: 
"Due Process," 70 Harv. L. Rev. 1406, 1407 (1957)). 
116. Fox, supra n. 1, at 683. 
117. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
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Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was "'so 
fundamental and essential to a fair trial, and so, to due process 
of law, that it is made obligatory upon the States by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.'"118 Gideon rests upon the "obvious 
truth" that lawyers are "necessities, not luxuries" in 
adversarial systems of truth finding. 119 "The very premise of 
our adversary system of criminal justice is that partisan 
advocacy on both sides of a case will best promote the ultimate 
objective that the guilty be convicted and the innocent go 
free." 120 The accused's life or liberty depends on his ability to 
present his defense in the face of "the intricacies of the law and 
the advocacy of the public prosecutor."121 While a student 
disciplinary hearing is not a criminal trial, it is not conducted 
in accordance with due process, and thus is not fair, unless the 
accused has the right to representation by counsel. 
Court decisions vary dramatically on the issue of 
representation by counsel at student disciplinary hearings, but 
courts consistently have held that students have the right to an 
attorney's participation in a disciplinary hearing when the 
university itself is represented by an attorney. Relying upon 
Wasson v. Townbridge, 122 the court in French v. Bashful123 held 
that a group of students who participated in a series of campus 
disturbances not only had a right to an attorney, but they also 
had the right to the full participation of an attorney because 
the university had a third-year law student prosecute the 
case.
124 
Courts have also frequently guaranteed students the right 
to an attorney in college disciplinary hearings involving 
criminal matters. In Gabrilowitz v. Newman, 125 the University 
of Rhode Island charged a student with assault with the intent 
to rape, a violation of the University's "Community Standards 
of Behavior." The student also faced similar criminal charges 
from the alleged incident. In this case, the First Circuit Court 
of Appeals held that when a disciplinary hearing concerns 
118. Id. at 340 (quoting Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 465 (1942), overruled); see 
also Powell v. Ala., 287 U.S. 45, 63 (1932); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938). 
119. 372 U.S. at 344. 
120. Herring v. N.Y., 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975). 
121. U. S. v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 309 (1973). 
122. Wasson v. Townbridge, 382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967). 
123. French v. Bashful, 303 F. Supp. 1333 (E.D. La. 1969). 
124. ld. at 1338. 
125. Gabrilowitz v. Newman, 582 F.2d 100 Clst Cir. 1978). 
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allegations surrounding a pending criminal case, the student 
has a right to the advice of counsel. 126 
Courts also have recognized that students have the right to 
have an attorney participate in a disciplinary hearing even 
when non-criminal matters are at issue. In Crook v. Baker, 127 
the court held that the University of Michigan had to provide a 
graduate student, who was accused of fabricating data for his 
thesis, the opportunity to be meaningfully represented by 
counsel, and to have that counsel fully participate in all 
proceedings. 128 The court explained: "Although the rescission of 
an advanced academic degree is not unprecedented, fortunately 
it is an event which occurs infrequently. The procedures that 
due process requires in this context could possibly be 
burdensome in other more frequently occurring contexts, but 
not here." 129 
An adverse outcome in a disciplinary hearing can result in 
damage to a student's reputation and career. This damage 
could limit the student's ability to practice in his chosen 
profession. Additionally, the courts have recognized that 
students have a vested liberty or property right that could be 
affected by a disciplinary hearing. 130 To protect those rights, 
accused students must be allowed to be fully represented by 
counsel at a disciplinary hearing. 
F. Right to an Open Hearing 
One right enjoyed by those accused of crimes, the right to 
an open hearing, is not generally recognized for accused 
students. Even so, the right to an open hearing is historically 
rooted as a fundamental right essential to achieving fairness. 
"The fundamental requirement of due process is the 
opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a 
. f 1 "111 Wh t . d . d b meaning u manner. - a process IS ue IS measure y a 
flexible standard that depends on the practical requirements of 
the circumstances. 132 
126. !d. at 106. 
127. 584 F. Supp. 1531 (E.D. Mich. 1984), vacated. 
128. Id. at 1559. 
129. !d. at 1557. 
130. Goss, 419 U.S. at 574. 
131. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333. 
132. !d. at 334 (quoting Morrissey u. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)); Goss, 419 
U.S. at 577-578. 
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The Sixth Amendment states: "In all criminal prosecutions, 
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, 
by an impartial jury."133 This constitutional guarantee and 
cherished right is derived from the English common law. As 
John Lilburne declared in 1649 during his trial for high 
treason, a public trial is "the first fundamental liberty" of a free 
people. 134 Lilburne continued, "[b]y the laws of England, all 
courts ofjustice always ought to be free and open for all sorts of 
peaceable people to see, behold and hear, and have free access 
unto; and no man whatsoever ought to be tried in holes or 
corners, or in any place, where the gates are shut and barred, 
and guarded with armed men."135 
When Blackstone drafted his Commentaries on the 
Common Laws of England in 1765, openness had become the 
rule. In the conduct of a criminal proceeding, as he explains, 
"all this evidence is to be given in open court, in the presence of 
the parties, their attorneys, the counsel, and all by-standers; 
and before the judge and jury."136 The reason for this, 
Blackstone continues, is that "[t)his open examination of 
witnesses viva voce, in the presence of all mankind, is much 
more conducive to the clearing up of truth, than the private 
and secret examination taken down in writing before an officer, 
or his clerk, in the ecclesiastical courts, and all others that 
have borrowed their practice from the civillaw."137 
Openness in formal proceedings not only facilitates arriving 
at the truth more readily, but also results in all parties 
connected with the proceeding performing their functions more 
conscientiously. 138 Hearings conducted in secret have a scent of 
grave injustice reminiscent of the Spanish Inquisition and the 
English Star Chamber. In 17th century England, the Lords of 
the Star Chamber proceeded as inquisitors. An accused's trial 
was based on charges made by accusers unknown and not 
disclosed to the accused. 139 In addition, the accused could be 
133. U.S. Const. amend. VI. 
134. N Cobbett's Complete Collection of State Trials, 1270, 1273 (T.B. Howell 
ed., 1816). 
135. Id. 
136. William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Common Laws of England vol. 3, 
372 (1765). 
137. !d. at 373. 
138. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 383 (1979). 
139. See Geoffrey Radcliffe & Geoffrey Cross, The English Legal System 107-108 
(5th ed. 1971); John H. Wigmore, On Evidence vol. 8 § 2250, 282-284 (Little Brown & 
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examined under torture, with the ultimate decision left to a 
court sitting without a jury. 140 Thus, the right of the accused to 
have his hearings open to the public is rooted in history and 
derived from English common law in response to the Star 
Chamber. 
In addition to historical precedents, there are other 
compelling functional reasons for assuring openness of student 
conduct code proceedings. The alleged victim and the 
community have an interest in seeing that offenders are 
brought forward to face responsibility. In addition, the 
community has an interest in knowing that fair standards are 
followed in the conduct of such proceedings and that variance 
from established norms will become known. 141 
In Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 142 the United 
States Supreme Court ruled that the constitutional right to an 
open, public trial is one shared by the accused and the public 
and that the right to access attaches as well to pretrial 
proceedings. 143 The rationale for such a First Amendment right 
is found in the history of the English common law and the 
constructive function of the public's presence in criminal 
d. 144 procee mgs. 
The right of access is the rule, and it is a rare and 
exceptional case where it does not apply. 145 A court must make 
"specific, on the record findings ... demonstrating that 'closure 
is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored 
to serve that interest."'146 Even in those rare cases, it is the 
rights of the accused, not the victim or witness, which require 
protection from an open hearing. 147 The only proceedings that 
courts have consistently held closed are grand jury proceedings 
Co. 1961). 
140. Radcliffe, at 107-108. 
141. See Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 464 U.S. 501, 508-509 (1984) 
(hereinafter Press-Enter. I ) (voir dire examinations of potential jurors covered by 
guarantee of open public proceedings in criminal trials). 
142. Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct. 478 U.S. 1 (1986) (hereinafter Press-Enter. II 
). 
14:3. Id. at 7. 
144. See id. at 8-9. 
145. See U.S. u. Haller, 8:37 F.2d 84, 86-87 (2d Cir.1988). 
146. Press-Enter. II, 478 U.S. at 13-14 (quoting Press-Enter. I, 464 U.S. at 510); 
see In reNew York Times, 828 F.2d 110, 116 (2d Cir. 1987) (relying on Press-Enterprise 
II balancing test). 
147. Press·Enter. I, 464 U.S. at 510; Richmond Newsps. Inc., v. Va, 448 U.S. 555, 
581 (1980). 
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where "the proper functioning of our grand jury system 
depends upon the secrecy of grand jury proceedings."148 Absent 
an overriding interest carefully articulated by the trial court 
for closure, the Court has stated that hearings should be open 
to the public. 149 When the accused desires an open and public 
hearing to answer charges against him, courts are nearly 
unanimous in determining that this fundamental right may not 
be abridged. 
It should be noted that while an open hearing is preferable 
in reaching a just and fair conclusion, this commentary in no 
way suggests that an institution should forego its 
responsibilities under the Family Education Rights and 
Privacy Act (FERPA) of 1974. 15° FERPA protects the 
confidentiality of a student's educational records, including 
disciplinary records, and thus prohibits an institution from 
holding an open hearing, unless the accused student consents 
to it. A student conduct code should include the option of an 
open hearing upon the request of the accused. For example, 
UNLV's student conduct code provides, "[t]he hearing is closed 
unless the person charged requests an open hearing." 151 
In this era of elevated enlightenment of "victims' rights," 
many institutions have mandated that all disciplinary hearings 
be closed to protect the alleged victim from any 
embarrassment, ridicule, or retaliation. This is especially true 
when sexual assault is alleged. While any hearing process is 
difficult for victims, the victims' discomfort does not negate the 
rights of the accused or lessen the jeopardy the accused face. 
G. Evidentiary Standard of Proof 
At a minimum, university officials should grant an accused 
student the presumption of innocence and should bear the 
burden in a university disciplinary proceeding of proving by 
"substantial evidence" that the student violated a provision of 
the established code of conduct. 152 Many federal courts have 
held, however, that such a standard is insufficient because no 
148. Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 218 (1979). 
149. See Richmond, 448 U.S. at 580-581. 
150. 20 U.S. C. § 1232(g) (1974). 
151. UNLV Student Conduct Code, supra n. 8. 
152. Slaughter v. Brigham Young V., 514 F.2d 622, 625 (lOth Cir.), cert denied, 
423 U.S. 898 (1975) (some weight must be given to determining the facts when there is 
substantial evidence of a violation). 
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clear level of proof can be inferred from the standard. In Smyth 
u. Lubber, 153 accused students were suspended after the All-
College Judiciary found the students guilty of marijuana 
possession. The federal District Court for the Western District 
of Michigan held that due process required the university to set 
a standard of proof greater than "substantial evidence" when 
the alleged conduct was also a crime. 154 "The court is certain 
that the standard cannot be lower than 'preponderance of the 
evidence."'155 In addition, "given the nature of the charges and 
the serious consequences of the conviction, the court believes 
that the higher standard of 'clear and convincing evidence' may 
be required."156 
Many institutions have adopted higher standards of proof 
than that of "substantial evidence."157 The University of Miami 
requires a finding of "clear and convincing evidence."158 The 
University of Virginia159 and the United States Air Force 
153. Smyth u. Lubber, 398 F. Supp. 777, 781 (W.D. Mich. 1975). 
154. Walter Saurack, Protecting the Student: A Critique of the Procedural 
Protection Affbrded to Am. and English Students in Uniu. Disciplinary Hearings, 21 
.J.C. & U.L. 785, 798 (1995) (citing Smyth, 398 F. Supp. at 798); Givens u. Poe, 346 F. 
Supp. 202, 209 (W.D.N.C. 1972) (due process requires that a decision be based on 
substantial evidence); Herman u. U. of S.C., 341 F. Supp. 226, 231 (D.S.C. 1971), affd 
per curiam, 457 F.2d 902 (4th Cir. 1972) ("No serious disciplinary action can be taken 
unless it is based upon substantial evidence"); Speake v. Grantham, 317 F. Supp. 1253, 
1281 (S.D. Miss. 1970) (disciplinary proceeding conviction must be based upon 
substantial evidence). 
155. Saurack (quoting Smyth, 398 F. Supp. at 799). 
156. Saurack (citing Nicholas Trott Long, The Standard of Proof in Student 
Disciplinary Cases, 12 J.C. & U.L. 71 (1985)) (supporting the "clear and convincing" 
standard because the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard is unnecessarily stringent 
and the "by a preponderance" standard is unnecessarily lax). 
157. DiMatteo & Wiesner, supra n. 117, at 94-95. ("We have chosen to review 
what we considered the three most important procedural due process concerns: (1) the 
right to cross-examination, (2) the right to representation, and (3) the standard of 
review. However, a number of other 'less important' due process issues have been 
addressed by the courts."). See, e.g., Gorman v. U. of R. I., 837 F.2d 7, 15-16 (1st Cir. 
1988) (lack of a written transcript is not fatal; however, the student may have a right 
to tape record proceedings); U. of Tex. Med. Sch. v. Than, 834 S.W.2d 425, 431 (Tex. 
App. 1992) (university's failure to follow its own procedures does "not per se violate due 
process"); Birdwell, 403 F. Supp. at 715 (Air Force Cadet has no privilege against self-
incrimination). 
158. Di Matteo & Wiesner, supra n. 117, at 94 (citing U. of Miami, U. of Miami 
Undergraduate Student Honor Code 1, 8 (1986)). 
159. Id. ("The Virginia ,Judicial System only provides that there 'must be 
agreement of 2/3 of the trial panel' to assess guilt." University of Virginia, The 
Judicial System 8 (1989). "However, the separate Honor Committee System requires a 
finding of guilt 'beyond a reasonable doubt' by a '4/5ths lvotel of the committee 
members.' Henson u. Honor Comm. ofU. Va., 719 F.'2.d 69,73 (4th Cir. 1983)."). 
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Academy require a finding of guilt "beyond a reasonable 
doubt."160 Requiring a higher degree of proof "supplies added 
protection to a process lacking some of the procedural 
protections found in more adversarial proceedings."161 The 
severity of possible sanctions and notation upon the academic 
record make a higher degree of evidence a reasonable and fair 
accommodation. 
H. Conclusion 
A student conduct code which provides adequate procedural 
due process must ensure that an accused student receives 
adequate notice, a fair hearing, the right to cross-examine 
witnesses, the right to be represented by counsel, the right to 
an open hearing, and a fair evidentiary standard of proof. A 
failure to protect any of these rights results in a flawed system 
that prevents the discovery of truth at the expense of the 
student's rights. 
V. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 
A. In General 
In addition to the procedural protections outlined above, the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides a 
guarantee against arbitrary decisions that would impair 
appellants' constitutionally protected interests. 162 This 
guarantee is called "substantive due process," and it protects 
certain fundamental "substantive" rights we all share. The 
Supreme Court has said of substantive due process that, "the 
Due Process Clause guarantees more than fair process, and the 
'liberty' it protects includes more than the absence of physical 
160. !d. (citing Birdwell v. Schlesinger, 403 F. Supp. 710, 715 (D. Colo. 1975)) 
("The standard for determination of guilt is that of reasonable doubt and a unanimous 
vote of the board."). 
161. !d. ("We have chosen to review what we considered the three most important 
procedural due process concerns: (1) the right to cross-examination, (2) the right to 
representation, and (3) the standard of review. However, a number of other 'less 
important' due process issues have been addressed by the courts."). See, e.g., Gorman v. 
U. of R. I., 837 F.2d 7, 15-16 (1st Cir. 1988) (lack of a written transcript is not fatal; 
however, the student may have a right to tape record proceedings); U. a{ Tex. Med. Sch. 
v. Than, 834 S.W.2d 425, 431 (Tex. App. 1992) (university's failure to follow its own 
procedures does "not per se violate due process"); Birdwell, 403 F. Supp. at 715 (Air 
Force Cadet has no privilege against self-incrimination). 
162. Dixon, 294 F.2d at 157. 
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restraint." 163 It provides "heightened protection against 
government interference with certain fundamental rights and 
liberty interests."164 As the court stated in Dixon, "the 
governmental power to expel the plaintiffs ... is not unlimited 
and cannot be arbitrarily exercised. Admittedly, there must be 
some reasonable and constitutional ground for expulsion or the 
courts would have a duty to require reinstatement."165 Under 
principles of substantive due process, students cannot be 
disciplined for constitutionally protected actions, or for actions 
which the government has no legitimate interest in punishing. 
Private schools are also bound by a similar requirement. 
Courts will review the disciplinary decisions of private schools 
to ensure that they are not arbitrary and capricious, 166 and that 
the process is conducted with basic fairness. 167 
While it may seem obvious that constitutionally protected 
activities may not be forbidden, it is not always obvious what 
specific activities are actually protected. Prior to being 
redrafted in 2000, the UNLV student conduct code banned 
several acts that were arguably constitutionally protected, 
including "[t]he repeated use of obscene or abusive language in 
a public setting where such usage is beyond the bounds of 
generally accepted good taste"; "[c]reating a situation ... which 
produces mental or physical discomfort, injury or stress, or 
embarrassment, or ridicule"; and "[a]ny actions, including 
those of a sexual nature or involving sexual activities, which 
are intimidating, demeaning, harassing, coercive, or abusive to 
another person, or which invade the right to privacy of another 
person."108 These provisions, while designed to control abusive 
behavior, arguably infringed upon the First Amendment rights 
of students by prohibiting protected speech, and potentially 
restricting consensual acts between adults. These provisions 
were eliminated in the 2000 revision. 
B. Free Speech 
The First Amendment provides the basis for much of the 
163. Washington u. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997). 
164. !d. at 720. 
165. Dixon, 294 F.2d at 157. 
166. Coveney, 445 N.E.2d at 138; Ahlum, 617 S.2d at 98-99; Psi Upsilon, 591 A.2d 
at 760; Anderson, 1995 WL 813188, at 4-5. 
167. Cloud v. Trustees of Boston U, 720 F.2d 721, 725 (1st Cir. 1983). 
168. UNLV Student Conduct Code, supra n. 8, (portions repealed). 
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case law arising out of school disciplinary actions. The courts 
have consistently held that free speech is not a right restricted 
to adults. In Klein v. Smith, 169 the plaintiffwas suspended from 
high school for giving a teacher "the finger" after school hours 
and off school grounds. The student filed suit. Granting an 
application for a permanent injunction against school officials, 
the court concluded that giving "the finger" constituted 
speech, 170 and that the suspension violated the student's First 
Amendment rights. e71 ] 
Schools also may not interfere with protected religious 
speech. The federal District Court for the Southern District of 
Texas held in Chalifoux v. New Crtney Indep. Sch. Dist. 172 that 
absent evidence of actual disruption, a school policy prohibiting 
a Catholic student from wearing a rosary to school on the 
ground that some gangs had adopted the rosary as their 
identifying symbol, violated the student's religiously-motivated 
speech. 173 
In a recent trend, schools have attempted to take 
disciplinary action against students who have used their home 
computers to engage in speech that school officials find 
offensive. A Missouri school district suspended a student for 
posting a webpage criticizing school administrators. 174 The 
webpage used vulgar language to convey the student's opinion 
of teachers and the principal. 175 In addition, the webpage 
contained a hyper-link to the school's website and invited 
others to contact the school principal to convey their 
criticism. 176 The court held that the student's homepage did 
not materially and substantially interfere with school 
discipline and enjoined the school district from restricting the 
student's use ofhis home computer to repast the homepage. 177 
In another case involving home computer usage, Zachariah 
Paul, a Pennsylvania high school student and member of the 
track team, composed a "Top Ten" list about the school's 
169. Klein v. Smith, 635 F. Supp. 1440 (D. Me. 1986). 
170. !d. at 1442, n. 3. 
171. !d. at 1442. 
172. Chalifoux v. New Caney Indep. Sch. Dist., 976 F. Supp. 659 (S.D. Tex. 1997). 
173. !d. at 665. 
174. Beussink v. Woodland R-N Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (E. D. Mo. 1998). 
175. ld. at 1177. 
176./d. 
177. !d. at 1181-1182. 
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athletic director, Robert Bozzuto. 178 The list, drafted by Paul at 
home on his home computer, contained statements regarding 
Bozzuto's appearance, including the size of his genitals. 179 Paul 
then e-mailed the list to friends from his home computer. A 
recipient of the e-mail printed the list which was ultimately 
posted in the school's faculty lounge. Paul admitted to creating 
the list and consequently was suspended from school for 10 
days. The court overruled the suspension, holding that even 
though Paul received procedural due process, the school district 
violated his First Amendment right to engage in speech in his 
own home. 180 
C. Rational Relationship to Legitimate Interest 
In addition to protecting such fundamental rights as free 
speech, substantive due process assures that any government 
action must bear, at a minimum, a rational relationship to a 
legitimate governmental interest. In Alabama & Coushatta 
Tribes v. Big Sandy School District, IHI the federal District Court 
for the Eastern District of Texas provided two theories upon 
which a successful substantive due process claim may be made. 
First, "[i]f the suspensions were patently unreasonable or 
disproportionate to the offense, the [students] would be entitled 
to relief."182 Second, if there was a "substantial departure from 
accepted academic norms,"183 the student would also be entitled 
to relief. 
The so-called "zero tolerance" policies, enacted by many 
schools in response to the publicity of school violence in the late 
1990's, provide a potent example of the wholesale denial of 
substantive due process. These rules usually exact immediate 
and substantial penalties when students are found to be in 
possession of any drug or weapon. However, the "zero 
tolerance" nature of these policies prohibits school officials from 
making individualized determinations when a violation occurs. 
Dustin Seal, a student at a Knox County, Tennessee high 
178. Killion v. Franklin Regl. Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 448 (W.D. Pa. 
2001) 
179. Irl. at 448. 
180. Irl. at 457. 
181. Ala. & Coushatta Tribes u. Big Sandy Sch. Dist., 817 F. Supp. 1319 CE.D. 
Tex. 1993). 
182. Irl. at 1335. 
18:3. lrl. 
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school, drove his mother's car to a home football game in the 
fall of 1996. 184 When Seal arrived in the school parking lot, 
school officials requested that Seal consent to a voluntary 
vehicle search for alcohol. 185 Believing that he had nothing to 
hide, Seal consented. 186 The school officials found a hunting 
knife in the glove compartment of the vehicle. 187 Seal argued, 
and there was evidence that suggested, that he was not aware 
of the knife's presence in the vehicle. Based on the school's 
"zero tolerance" policy toward weapons, however, Seal was 
expelled. 188 The Seal family filed suit in federal court. 1x'> 
After the federal district court ruled in Seal's favor, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed 
the case. 190 The Sixth Circuit held that the school board's 
decision could not survive a legitimate state interest because 
expelling Seal for unknowingly possessing a knife was not 
rationally related to any legitimate state interest. 191 Reversing 
the district court, the Sixth Circuit explained, "[n]o student can 
use a weapon to injure another person, to disrupt school 
operations, or, for that matter, any other purpose if the student 
is totally unaware of its presence. Indeed, the entire concept of 
possession-in the sense of possession for which the state can 
legitimately prescribe and mete out punishment- ordinarily 
implies knowing or conscious possession."1n Clearly addressing 
supporters of "zero tolerance" policies, the court stated: "the 
Board may not absolve itself of its obligation, legal and moral, 
to determine whether students intentionally committed the 
acts for which their expulsions are sought by hiding behind a 
Zero Tolerance Policy that purports to make the student's 
knowledge a non-issue."193 
Zero tolerance policies, such as those practiced in Knox 
County, Tennessee, are irrational and unfair because they 
trample on the due process rights of students. There appears 
184. Robert C. Cloud, Say Yes to Due Process Before SayinR No to Wmpons, 15a 





189. !d. at 834. 
190. Seal v. Morgan, 229 F.3d 567 (6th Cir. 2000). 
191. ld. at 575. 
192. Id. at 575-576. 
193. !d. at 581. 
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to be a growing sentiment, in the courts and in society, that 
these policies violate students' rights. 194 In February 2001, the 
American Bar Association (ABA) passed a resolution 
condemning "zero tolerance" policies. 195 The ABA hopes to 
influence schools and lawmakers to rethink the issue. 
Providing an adequate procedural due process system does 
not give a blank check to the institution to bring charges 
against a student for any reason. The school's disciplinary 
action must be rationally related to a legitimate state interest 
and must not infringe on an established substantive right of 
the student. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
University administrators are quick to point out that a 
student disciplinary hearing is not a criminal trial or any other 
type of legal proceeding. For that reason, many institutions 
deny accused students some of their most basic and 
fundamental rights. The longer schools thumb their noses at 
due process and fundamental fairness, however, the more 
likely it is that courts will intervene in their actions. 
Many of the rights discussed in this article were established 
throughout history as the result of controlling powers 
determining the fate of individuals with the swoop of one heavy 
hand. Society eventually realized that the powerful, with their 
unlimited resources, were often too much for the weak to 
overcome. To strike a balance, the courts began to recognize 
certain rights as inalienable. 
The position of power held by universities and colleges is 
remarkably similar to that of the government in criminal 
matters. College students are often away from home for the 
first time and are forced to depend on their respective 
university or college to provide food, shelter, and other basic 
accommodations. In essence, the student lives at the mercy of 
the school. If a student is accused of violating a school 
regulation, the institution usually has a staff member or a full 
department solely devoted to investigating and, if necessary, 
194. Cloud, supra n. 184, at 846 (citing Sasha Polakow-Suransky, America's 
Least Wanted: Zero Tolerance Policies and the Fate of Expelled Students, in The Public 
Assault on America's Children: Poverty, Violence, and Juvenile Injustice, 101-129 
(Valerie Polakow ed., Teachers College Press 2000). 
195. Am. Bar Assn., Res. to the H. of Delegates (San Diego, Cal. February 19, 
2001l. 
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bringing charges against the student. Unless the student has 
access to substantial financial resources, he is often left to fend 
for himself. 
The extension of fundamental due process rights to an 
accused student does not in any way provide an advantage to 
the student; rather, it establishes fairness in a process which 
may have serious and life-changing ramifications for the 
student. A student who is expelled is often unable to enroll in 
a different school due to his inability to demonstrate to the new 
school that he left his former school in good standing. A 
university or college degree is required for employment in 
many fields and for admission to graduate and professional 
schools. In addition, employees with a university or college 
degree generally earn higher salaries than those who are not 
graduates. Therefore, an expulsion made in error may 
significantly affect a student's future economic opportunities 
for the remainder of the student's life. 
It is the role of our institutions of higher learning to 
educate the members of our communities. Perhaps there is no 
greater lesson than fairness and justice for all, starting in their 
own backyards. 
